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Turkish-­‐Israeli	   relations	   suffered	  a	  big	  blow	  because	  of	   the	  Mavi	  Marmara	  affair.	  As	  Turkey	  and	  
Israel	  are	  working	  now	  on	  mending	  their	  relations,	  the	  question	  remains	  whether	  they	  will	  be	  able	  
to	  avoid	  fierce	  competition	   in	  a	  relentlessly	  changing	  Middle	  East	  following	  the	  ‘Arab	  Spring’.	  As	  
there	  are	  also	  mutual	  concerns	  and	  incentives	  to	  cooperate,	  the	  term	  ‘Frenmity’	  may	  be	  the	  best	  
way	  to	  describe	  the	  future	  relations	  between	  the	  two.	  In	  such	  a	  complex	  relationship,	  the	  United	  
States	  may	  be	  of	  help	  in	  increasing	  the	  elements	  of	  amity	  and	  cooperation.	  
Introduction	  
As	   the	   Arab	   states	   of	   the	  Middle	   East	   face	   the	   dramatic	   events	   changing	   the	   region's	   political	  
configuration,	   two	   immediate	   non-­‐Arab	   neighbors,	   namely	   Turkey	   and	   Israel,	   are	   not	   passively	  
watching,	   and	   are	   continuing	   to	   try	   and	   mend	   their	   relations,	   thus	   far	   unsuccessfully.	   Prime	  
Minister	  Netanyahu’s	  apology	  to	  his	  Turkish	  counterpart	  notwithstanding	  (Keinon,	  2013),	  the	  two	  
sides	  are	  seemingly	  still	  quibbling	  on	  the	  question	  of	  compensation	  to	  the	  families	  of	  those	  killed	  
in	   the	  May	   2010	  Mavi	  Marmara	   affair.	   The	   countries,	   who	   just	   four	   years	   ago	   had	  maintained	  
extensive	  diplomatic,	  economic	  and	  security	  relations,	  are	  unlikely	  to	  restore	  the	  web	  of	  the	  past	  
ties.	   The	   question	   remains	  whether	   they	  will	   be	   able	   to	   avoid	   fierce	   competition	   in	   a	   changing	  
Middle	  East,	  even	  if	  they	  were	  to	  resolve	  their	  problems	  relating	  to	  the	  Mavi	  Marmara.	  Frenmity	  
would	  be	  the	  best	  way	  to	  describe	  the	  future	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  (Özkeçeci-­‐Taner,	  2012,	  p.	  
122).	   
In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  Israel	  and	  Turkey	  have	  developed	  two	  different	  strategies	  for	  
dealing	  with	   the	   developing	   situation.	   Israel,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   followed	   an	   overtly	   "hands	   off"	  
policy	  towards	  the	  events	  in	  adjacent	  Arab	  states.	  It	  jealously	  adhered	  to	  this	  policy,	  even	  as	  more	  
than	  120,000	  have	  been	  killed	  in	  Syria,	  and	  it	  stayed	  away	  from	  the	  public	  international	  debate	  on	  
whether	   to	   punish	   the	   Assad	   regime	   for	   using	   chemical	   weapons.	   Israel	   did,	   however,	   quietly	  
lobby	  Washington	   not	   to	   cut	   aid	   to	   Egypt	   (Ravid,	   2013)	   after	   the	   army	   pushed	   out	   the	  Muslim	  
Brotherhood-­‐affiliated	   president	   and	   government	   in	   July	   this	   year.	   Turkey,	   in	   contrast,	   has	  
followed	  a	  very	  forceful	  and	  vociferous	  policy,	  calling	  for	  active	  intervention	  in	  Syria	  and	  helping	  
anti-­‐Assad	  groups.	  It	  openly	  denounced	  the	  new	  government	  in	  Egypt	  (Today’s	  Zaman,	  2013a)	  and	  
has	  continued	  the	  policy	  of	  supporting	  the	  Hamas	  government	  in	  Gaza.	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Comparing	   the	   interim	   score-­‐sheets	   reveals	   some	   setbacks	   for	   the	   Erdoğan	   government	  
against	  some	  gains	  for	  Israel.	  The	  survival	  hitherto	  of	  the	  Syrian	  regime,	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  presumably	  
ideological	  sister	  government	  in	  Egypt	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  Kurdish	  autonomous	  entity	  on	  
its	   borders	  must	   be	   viewed	   from	   Turkey	   with	   concern,	   though	   these	   are	   not	   issues	   which	   will	  
decide	  the	  political	   future	  of	  the	  AKP.	   Israel,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  has	  witnessed	  the	  weakening	  of	  
the	  Syrian	  army	  and	  Hezbollah,	  both	  of	  which	  have	  been	  bogged	  down	  in	  a	  war	  of	  attrition.	  It	  can	  
also	  certainly	  expect	  better	  cooperation,	  albeit	  below	  the	  radar,	  with	  the	  military-­‐led	  government	  
in	  Egypt,	  which	  has	  already	  taken	  very	  strong	  action	  against	  smuggling	  into	  Gaza	  and	  against	  terror	  
groups	  operating	  in	  the	  Sinai	  (Reuters,	  2013). 
Sketching	  the	  Lines	  of	  Amity	  and	  Enmity 
Some	  of	  the	  gains	  and	  losses	  mentioned	  will	  be	  short	  term	  ones.	  Nonetheless,	  there	  are	  long-­‐term	  
processes,	  some	  of	  which	  began	  before	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  that	  could	  result	  in	  structural	  changes	  in	  
the	   region.	  Political	  borders,	  which	  were	  drawn	  almost	  100	  years	  ago,	  may	  be	   replaced	  by	  new	  
ones,	  whether	  de	  jure	  as	  in	  the	  Sudan	  or	  de	  facto	  as	  in	  Iraq. 
Similarly,	   there	   may	   be	   growth	   in	   the	   number	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors	   in	   the	   region	   as	   some	  
previously	  existing	  states	  have	  been	  split	  and	  the	  authority	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  central	   regimes	  
have	  been	  gradually	  eroded.	  Both	  Syria	  and	  Iraq	  serve	  as	  evidence	  for	  this	  analysis	  and	  prognosis.	  
Neither	   will	   return	   to	   their	   status	   as	   it	   has	   existed	   since	   the	   end	   of	   World	   War	   I.	   Both	   could	  
witness	  years	  of	  internal	  violence,	  instability	  and	  the	  mushrooming	  of	  terror	  groups,	  which	  benefit	  
from	  the	  emasculated	  central	  governments	  and	  security	  forces. 
Among	   other	   possible	   consequences,	   one	   could	   add	   the	   growing	   distancing	   of	   external	  
powers	  from	  the	  region,	  especially	  the	  US,	  and	  the	  further	  weakening	  of	  the	  Arab	  League. 
This	  is,	  in	  broad	  terms,	  the	  geo-­‐strategic	  arena	  that	  both	  Turkey	  and	  Israel	  will	  be	  watching	  in	  
the	  next	  decade.	  They	  may	  not	  necessarily	  reach	  similar	  conclusions	  and	  they	  may	  find	  reasons	  for	  
both	  cooperating	  and	  competing.	  The	  Kurdish	  issue	  is	  a	  clear	  example.	  For	  Israel,	  the	  emergence	  
of	  an	  independent,	  non-­‐Arab	  political	  entity	  in	  the	  region	  is	  a	  positive	  development,	  regardless	  of	  
the	  location	  of	  the	  future	  borders	  of	  this	  entity.	  The	  view	  from	  Ankara	  is	  different.	  Turkey	  may	  feel	  
the	  need	  at	  present	   to	  cooperate	  with	   the	  Kurdish	  Regional	  Government,	  but	   it	  must	  be	  deeply	  
concerned	  by	   the	   implications	  of	   an	   independent	   Kurdistan	  on	   its	   own	  Kurdish	  minority.	  Active	  
Israeli	  support	  for	  an	  independent	  Kurdistan	  would	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  wishes	  of	  Turkey.	  
Interestingly,	   Turkey	   and	   Israel	  might	   share	   similar	   problems,	   concerns	   and	  ways	   and	  means	  of	  
dealing	  with	  an	   independent	  Kurdistan	  and	  an	   independent	  Palestine.	  While	   Israel	  may	  want	   to	  
have	  an	  open	  line	  to	  the	  political	  leadership	  of	  Kurdistan,	  Ankara	  may	  wish	  to	  have	  such	  a	  line	  to	  
the	   leaders	   of	   independent	   Palestine.	   This	   could	   be	   a	   subject	   of	   a	   tacit	   agreement	   on	   rules	   of	  
engagement	  or	  a	  free	  for	  all	  competition.	   
Syria,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   may	   become	   an	   area	   of	   cooperation.	   Turkey	   and	   Israel	   share	   a	  
mutual	  interest	  in	  preventing	  this	  country	  from	  becoming	  an	  operational	  base	  for	  terror	  groups	  of	  
all	  sorts.	  In	  principle,	  Israel	  should	  not	  object	  to	  Syria	  being	  within	  the	  Turkish	  zone	  of	  influence	  if	  
that	  could	  become	  part	  of	  a	  regional	  understanding	  between	  Ankara	  and	  Jerusalem. 
The	  issue	  of	  a	  nuclear	  Iran	  could	  be	  part	  of	  future	  understandings,	  and	  conversely,	  continue	  to	  
be	   a	   bone	   of	   contention.	   While	   Israel	   does,	   and	   Turkey	   does	   not,	   view	   a	   nuclear	   Iran	   as	   an	  
existential	   threat,	   both	   wish	   to	   prevent	   this	   situation.	   For	   Turkey,	   a	   nuclear	   Iran	   may	   pose	   a	  
dilemma,	  whether	  to	  continue	  to	  rely	  on	  NATO’s	  nuclear	  umbrella	  or	  to	  go	  nuclear	  itself.	  For	  the	  
time	  being,	  Turkish	   leaders	  are	  calling	   for	  a	  Middle	  East	  Nuclear	  Free	  Zone	  as	  part	  of	  a	  possible	  
diplomatic	   solution	   to	   the	   Iranian	   nuclear	   project	   (Today’s	   Zaman,	   2013b),	   and	   this	  may	   cause	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them	  to	  double	  these	  efforts	  and	  denunciation	  of	   Israel	   in	  this	  respect.	  Here	  again,	  a	  process	  of	  
reconciliation	  between	  Turkey	  and	  Israel	  may	  allow	  the	  two	  to	  become	  partners	   in	  the	  call	   for	  a	  
peaceful	   Iranian	   nuclear	   project,	   though	   agreeing	   not	   to	   agree	   on	   how	   to	   get	   to	   a	  Middle	   East	  
Nuclear	  Free	  Zone. 
One	  domain	  where	  the	  state	  of	  frenmity	  cannot	  be	  sufficient	  is	  the	  energy	  market.	  Currently,	  
the	  major	  part	  of	  Israel's	  oil	  imports	  pass	  through	  Turkey	  in	  the	  Baku-­‐Tbilisi-­‐Ceyhan	  pipeline.	  The	  
discovery	   of	   large	   natural	   gas	   reservoirs	   off	   shore	   in	   the	   Eastern	   Mediterranean	   creates	   the	  
possibility	   of	   Turkey,	   with	   a	   growing	   need	   for	   energy	   and	   for	   the	   diversification	   of	   its	   sources,	  
becoming	  both	  a	  consumer	  and	  land	  of	  transit	  of	  gas	  to	  Europe.	  But	  beyond	  the	  domestic	  debate	  
in	  Israel	  about	  the	  wisdom	  of	  exporting	  (Shamah,	  2013),	  there	  is	  a	  quiet	  debate	  about	  the	  wisdom	  
of	  putting	  too	  many	  (energy)	  eggs	   in	  the	  Turkish	  basket.	  The	  interruption	  of	  either	  oil	  or	  natural	  
gas	  by	  Turkey	  seems	  unlikely	  as	  it	  would	  cause	  serious	  direct	  and	  indirect	  damage	  to	  that	  country,	  
but	  Israel	  must	  be	  prudent	  in	  deciding	  these	  issues.	  Moreover,	  building	  future	  relations	  between	  
Turkey	  and	  Israel	  solely	  on	  an	  economic	  base	  may	  not	  be	  safe	  and	  durable,	  so	  political	  assurances	  
will	  also	  be	  required.	  
Conclusion 
Conflicting	  policies	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  mutual	  concerns	  and	  interests	  on	  the	  other	  underline	  the	  
complexity	   in	   current	   and	   future	   Turkish-­‐Israeli	   relations	   and	   justify	   their	   characterization	   as	  
frenmity.	  The	  United	  States	  can	  help	  increase	  the	  elements	  of	  amity	  and	  cooperation.	  While	  it	  is	  
difficult	   to	   foresee	  a	   restoration	  of	   relations	   in	   the	  realms	  of	  defense	  and	  security,	   some	  of	   this	  
can	  be	  recovered	   in	  the	  context	  of	  NATO,	  as	  both	  Turkey	  and	   Israel	  are	   interested	   in	  stability	   in	  
the	  Eastern	  Mediterranean. 
Both	  sides	  should	  not	   look	  at	   the	  settling	  of	   the	  Mavi	  Marmara	  affair	  as	  a	   substitute	   to	   full	  
normal	   relations	   and	   both	   sides	   have	   to	   agree	   that	   restoring	   their	   respective	   ambassadors	   is	  
important,	  but	  can	  serve	  as	  only	  one	  aspect	  of	  a	  return	  to	  normal	  relations.	  A	  deep,	  thorough	  joint	  
review	  of	  the	  relationships	  is	  certainly	  called	  for.	  Regional	  and	  bilateral	  circumstances	  justify	  that.	  
It	  may	  not	  eliminate	  conflict	  but	  it	  will	  increase	  the	  friendly	  factor	  in	  the	  frenmity.	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